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Function, Form, and Strawberries:
Subverting Langdell
Jeremiah A. Ho

I. Introduction
While many of us are feverishly trying to peg what is the “new normal” in
legal education these days, there should be an equally compelling urgency
to explore the new normative as well. With “should” as the operative, this
notion is itself reflexively normative; but truthfully it is critical that the spirit
of pondering over the state of affairs in law schools should unapologetically
include experimenting and refining toward enhanced teaching and learning in
the legal academy. We should never relegate normativity to an afterthought or
a punch line, but rather should always be striving to figure out what law school
pedagogy should be, how it best serves our students, and what is next for its
development in light of the next new normal of law schools and the next-next
new normal after that.
With that idealism in tow, this article turns to addressing an aspect of the
law classroom experience that has always come under fire even during the early
years of the Langdell case method: the lack of active learning experiences that
teach legal reasoning skills in doctrinal courses.1 Then the article humbly offers
a solution. The prevalence of formalism during those early years of American
law schools contributed to classroom teaching techniques that limited the
Jeremiah Ho is an Assistant Professor of Law at the University of Massachusetts School of Law.
The author would like to thank UMass Law librarians Jessica Almeida, Cathy O’Neill, and Emma
Wood. Special research assistance thanks to Felicia L. Carboni, Kurt J. Hagstrom, and Albert
Marks. He is also grateful to Michele Pistone and Billie Jo Kaufman for organizing the inaugural
LegalED conference, Igniting Law Teaching, at American University, Washington College of
Law, April 4, 2014. Finally, much appreciation also goes to the editors of the Journal of Legal
Education. This article is dedicated to the memory of Cathy O’Neill.
1.

See Alfred Z. Reed, Training for the Public Profession of the Law: Historical
Development and Principal Contemporary Problems of Legal Education in the
United States, with Some Account of Conditions in England and Canada, Bulletin
No. 15, 48 (1921) (critiquing how practical training and “even its remnants are not usually
regarded by the law schools as worth preserving, now that [law schools] have virtually
preempted the entire field of legal education.”); see also Roy Stuckey et al., Best Practices
for Legal Education, A Vision and a Road Map 104 (2007) (“Legal education would be
more effective if law teachers used context-based education throughout the curriculum.”).

Journal of Legal Education, Volume 64, Number 4 (May 2015)

Function, Form, and Strawberries

657

learning of skills on several different levels.2 What is plainly curious—and
ultimately egregious—has been the prevalence of these formalist experiences in
our teaching even when movements from legal realism to critical legal studies
have rejected formalist thinking.3 If we no longer subscribe to the formalist
tradition and our thinking about the law has progressed since the late 19th
century, why do we continue to teach law as if not much has changed?
Sparked by Professor Michele Pistone’s efforts toward bringing new ideas
to the forefront at her recent LegalED conference, Igniting Law Teaching,4 I
approached answering that question by posing my solution to teaching law
differently. The conference, held at American University, Washington College
of Law this past April 2014, brought a confluence of teaching and learning
ideas together through a new (or at least new to the many of us) presentation
format—the TED talk—and, partly because of it, was literally a confrontation
with change as we shared our insights.5 Ultimately, the conference invited
innovation in the current crisis in legal education, and this article is just one of
a number of fruits of that labor.
Beyond this Part I Introduction, Part II will briefly summarize why the
Langdell tradition is at heart a learning model that intrinsically marginalizes
active learning and exalts only a limited experience of skills teaching and
acquisition and will conclude that the Langdellian tradition creates a
hierarchy that juxtaposes knowledge of legal doctrine over skills. Part III will
demonstrate a method for law teachers to incorporate skills teaching actively
in the classroom, and do so in a way that legitimizes legal reasoning skills
and elevates the teaching and learning of skills. Hopefully, as the Conclusion
points out, the new normative in law schools should include a continuous
engagement with active learning that integrates skills into the doctrinal
classroom in a seamless way, rather than a formalist concept of education that
isolates and depoliticizes law from practice. Whatever the new normal of law
schools looks like now, one thing about the law will not change: The law is a
discipline that is brought to life by us and our students through its practice.6
We cannot ignore that aspect of this field—nor afford to.
2.

See Steven B. Dow, There’s Madness in the Method: A Commentary on Law, Statistics, and the Nature of
Legal Education, 57 Okla. L. Rev. 579, 580-82 (2004) (discussing legal formalism’s influence
on the emergence of the case method).

3.

See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Taking Law and ____ Really Seriously: Before, During and After “The
Law,” 60 Vand. L. Rev. 555, 560-76, 580 (2007) (describing the history and influence of
American legal movements from Langdell to post-modernists but noting ultimately that”
. . . “a major rethinking of legal education has not occurred, really, in over one hundred
years.”).

4.

See, e.g., ‘Igniting Law Teaching’ a TEDx-style conference, LegalED (Apr. 4, 2014), http://legaledweb.
com/schedule-igniting-law-teaching-april-4th/.

5.

See, e.g., Michele Pistone, Educational Videos for Legal Education, LegalED Blog (Nov. 11, 2014),
http://legaledweb.com/blog/.

6.

See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 3, at 557 (“Law is created by human beings to govern
themselves, to create order and social control, and, at its best, to provide justice. So, in my
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II. Form Over Function: The Langdellian Hierarchy
For a while the jig has been up; there is no mystery that the case method
is an educational model prone to furthering hierarchies. Duncan Kennedy
most famously articulated that reality in his Legal Education and the
Reproduction of Hierarchy7 in 1982, and others have followed since then.8
Pointing out a direct cause-and-effect in law school teaching and hierarchies,
Kennedy observed in crit-laden fashion that “[m]uch of what happens is the
inculcation through a formal curriculum and the classroom experience of a set
of political attitudes toward the economy and society in general, toward law,
and toward the possibilities of life in the profession.”9 A recent cadre of law
scholars has continued to pronounce the hierarchical potency of Langdell’s
law school model and examined how such hierarchy “endures”10—even after a
century and a half since Langdell and the formalists, and since the flaws and
inaccuracies in the way the formalists both thought about the law and have
taught it have been identified.11 As Olufunmilayo Arewa, Andrew Morriss,
and William Henderson recently articulated, “the development of the current
model of legal education [from Langdell] included features that facilitated the
establishment of an enduring hierarchy.”12
Not only is this infiltration of hierarchy historical,13 but it is also systemic as
the categorization between elite and non-elite schools affect significant choices
view, to study how law is made, interpreted, complied with, enforced, or resisted, is to study
how law is experienced−by those who make and interpret law, by those who use it and advise
others how to use it, and by those who are acted upon by law.”).
7.

See Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy, 32 J. Legal Educ. 591
(1982).

8.

See, e.g., Philip C. Kissam, The Discipline of Law Schools: The Making of Modern
Lawyers 109 (2003) (describing hierarchy in teaching judicial opinions) (“Law professors
make many hierarchical observations and normalizing judgments about judicial opinions.”);
Jay Feinman & Mark Feldman, Pedagogy and Politics, 73 Geo. L.J. 875, 896-97 (1984)
(describing law school hierarchy in “Darwinian terms”) (“The complex hierarchies of law
schools, law students, law professors, and lawyers’ practice settings are justified as reflecting
real differences in the abilities of those stratified. The educational system, from the earliest
grades to the law schools, is a process of continually finer sorting of students by natural
ability; the function of the system is the selection of talent, rather than the development of
talent across the board.”).

9.

Kennedy, supra note 7, at 595.

10.

See Olufunmilayo B. Arewa et al., Enduring Hierarchies in American Legal Education, 89 Ind. L J.
941 (2014).

11.

See, e.g., Edward Rubin, The Real Formalists, the Real Realists, and What They Tell Us About Judicial
Decision Making and Legal Education, 109 Mich. L. Rev. 863, 879 (2011) (“One problem with the
Langdellian approach, as noted above and as Tamanaha’s analysis of Formalist legal thought
indicates, is that it is less modern than it appears; the classroom dialogue is not intended to
teach a skill, but rather an understanding of the judicial process and the common law.”).

12.

Arewa et al., supra note 10, at 949.

13.

See id. at 945-50.

Function, Form, and Strawberries

659

law schools make including those regarding scholarship,14 administrative and
faculty hiring,15 and branding and marketing.16 From another angle, Brian
Tamanaha’s recent critique of law schools shows the undercurrent of hierarchy
that the Langdellian model of American law schools perpetuated.17 And yet,
his proposal to divide law schools into two separate camps—one academic
and another vocational—quite possibly shows the susceptibility of dividing
the identity of law schools between a hierarchy based on form (academic law
schools) over function (vocational law schools).18
But the lawyer’s penchant for ambiguity and the strategic avoidance of
absolutist statements prevent one from saying that Langdell was entirely wrong
about legal education. After all, Langdell’s efforts were in part addressing the
problems of legal education before and up until his time.19 Even superficially
speaking, Langdell’s case method was an improvement upon the hit-or-miss
training and learning experiences afforded by the apprenticeship model, which
eventually led to the conclusion that “reliance on busy practitioners to provide
an adequate legal education is an inherently and deeply flawed strategy.”20
Instead, the pedagogical fix that Langdell’s model provided was consistency
methodologically: “The Langdellian model law school addressed the problem
of unmotivated teachers, slowly, by utilizing full-time professors.”21
More profoundly, other than establishing a more consistent, more readily
available professoriate to train lawyers, the Langdellian method was also
more steady conceptually and metaphysically. Langdell’s view of law as a
science became the pedagogy that distinguished the analytical training in
14.

See id. at 976-90.

15.

See id. at 990-91.

16.

See id. at 992-1002.

17.

See, e.g., Brian Z. Tamanaha, Failing Law Schools 21-23 (2012). Tamanaha describes the
rise of the three-year law school model at Harvard Law School in 1878—presumably at the
hands of Langdell—as a process to standardize university-affiliated legal education in order
to attract students away from cheaper night law school programs taught by practitioners:
“Elite legal professionals who controlled the ABA worried that these new lawyers [from
cheaper night law schools] would further tarnish the already sullied reputation of the bar.”
Id. at 21.

18.

See, e.g., Robin L. West, Teaching Law: Justice, Politics, and the Demands of
Professionalism 20-21 (2014). West critiques Tamanaha’s proposal for reforming legal
education by deregulating schools into a “bifurcated model” with academic law schools
on one level and vocational law schools on another by noting its hierarchical potentials:
“[B]ifurcation would lead to a two-tiered and bifurcated legal profession . . . .” Id. at 21.

19.

See Michele R. Pistone & John J. Hoeffner, No Path But One: Law School Survival in the Age of
Disruptive Technology, 59 Wayne L. Rev. 193, 207-22 (2014) (describing, despite its conceptual
flaws, the rise of Langdell’s case method for law instruction as a response to remedy the
failings of the apprenticeship system of training lawyers).

20.

Id. at 217.

21.

Id. at 218.
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the academy from legal training done within the apprenticeship model.22 At
the close of the 19th century, it was clear that “[b]y general agreement, the
eventual replacement of the law office route by law schools greatly improved
the teaching of the analytical skills necessary to a successful career in the
law.”23 Thus, the institutionalizing of the legal academy in the 19th century has
brought some benefits to educating and training lawyers. Whether it brought
an academic legitimacy with all its bells and whistles that greatly improved
the apprenticeship model is debatable.24 The study of law, nevertheless, has
been given a methodology.25 That legacy, and knowing that Langdell was
intentionally part of the advance for change in legal education, prompts us to,
at least, take some reconciliatory spirit toward improving our teaching as well.
Still, even as we give Langdell his due, the opportunity to reshape the
model of legal education is now overdue. Both the nature and concept of
modern law have evolved immensely since Langdell’s heyday.26 The body
of common law and its accompanying traditions that the modern American
legal landscape once inherited now shares the terrain with administrative
and regulatory states and the idea of the law’s jurisprudential completeness
was long abolished when Legal Realism took over.27 But a strong imprint of
Langdell’s model, preserved in formalist conceptions, still remains.28 We see
its survival in the way our textbooks are still called “casebooks,”29 in the way
we still conduct our lectures Socratically,30 in the way we build the content
22.

Id. at 221-22.

23.

Id. at 222.

24.

See Arewa et al., supra note 10, at 946-47 (describing Langdell’s model at Harvard Law School
as the model that emerged successfully after lingering displeasure by legal elites such as
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., of previous law school models that resembled trade schools
rather than academic institutions).

25.

See Keith A. Findley, Rediscovering the Lawyer School: Curriculum Reform in Wisconsin, 24 Wis. Int’l
L.J. 295, 299-300 (2006) (“As a corollary to Langdell’s notion of law as science—that that
law is best understood by inductive reasoning from primary sources (appellate decisions)—
Langdell introduced the ‘case method’ of legal instruction.”) (citing Stephen M. Feldman,
The Transformation of an Academic Discipline: Law Professors in the Past and Future (or Toy Story Too), 54 J.
Legal Educ. 471, 476 (2004)).

26.

See, e.g., Menkel-Meadow, supra note 3, at 560-76.

27.

See Rubin, supra note 11, at 880 (noting that “common law is no longer the dominant law
of the United States” and that “the major part [of the law today] consists of statutes and
regulations, the legal machinery of modern regulatory government.”).

28.

See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 3, at 580.

29.

See id. at 563 (“Thousands of law students for many decades were taught essentially with the
same methods and from the same casebooks, regardless of region or differing career goals.”).

30.

See Matthew T. Bodie, Collaboration and Community: The Labor Law Group and the Future of Labor
and Employment Casebooks, 58 St. Louis U. L.J. 61, 62 (2013) (“The Socratic method is still
the usual method of instruction.”) (citing Edward Rubin, Should Law School Support Faculty
Research?, 17 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 139, 158 (2008)).
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of our courses—especially those in the first year—with canonical cases,31 in the
way we reward a student’s ability to analyze cases and reason through analogy
and precedence,32 and in the way we changed the first-year curriculum, usually
by adding to the original arrangement of private law courses (torts, contracts,
property, etc.) rather than rearranging it for a more transformative set.33
Others have attacked the Langdellian law school curriculum, seeing its
supposition of the law’s autonomy as too hermetic to the point that it excludes
other kinds of legal knowledge that would be relevant for law students.34 Of
recent note in the current discourse on the future of legal education, Robin
West has articulated that the study of both politics and justice are often
overshadowed by the traditional case method and that deficiencies of these
kinds of knowledge, despite their actual close relation to the law, in the
law classroom present to the current turmoil in law schools.35 The common
law tradition is not as complete as it was once thought. The realists poked
holes at the self-proclaimed supremacy of formalism in this way.36 But over a
century, the American legal tradition has also evolved to encompass the vast
codification of rules of law and stoke a growing need to study legisprudence and
the administrative state in addition to common law traditions.37 And so if the
primary reason to conduct classes Socratically was a belief in the completeness
of our inherited body of common law traditions so that a scientific inquiry
could be used to study it, and if such an idea about the law is no longer as true
31.

See Robert W. Gordon, Simpson’s Leading Cases, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 2044, 2044 (1996) (“Although
the ideal of legal science that the ‘case method’ was supposed to inculcate has faded over
the years, the method has spread to every law school in America, and with it the (remarkably
durable) repertoire of famous cases that almost every student still encounters in the first year
of law study.”).

32.

See R. Michael Cassidy, Beyond Practical Skills: Nine Steps for Improving Legal Education Now, 53 B.C.
L. Rev. 1515, 1520-21 (2012) (describing how “[t]he case method presumes that lawyers, as
social ‘scientists,’ can study appellate decisions to uncover legal principles, classify and
organize these principles, and then develop a structure that will allow them to apply the
doctrines to a more general set of facts in order to reach a solution to legal questions”
and then noting that “[t]his process of conceptualization and categorization—so heavily
emphasized in law schools for the past 150 years—employs an inductive form of reasoning
and teaches students to reason from specific examples (i.e., appellate decisions) to universal
propositions.” (citations omitted)).

33.

See, e.g., West, supra note 18, at 188-93 (describing changes that would bring teaching of
justice and politics into the traditional law school curriculum for more normative results).

34.

See A. Benjamin Spencer, The Law School Critique in Historical Perspective, 69 Wash. & Lee L.
Rev. 1949, 2023-24 (2012) (mentioning broadly that “[o]ne consequence of [Langdell’s]
doctrinal approach is that the study of law is conceptualized as the study of legal rules—a
Langdellian innovation—rather than a broader study of legal practice involving the study
of legal regulation as a social phenomenon and training in the full array of methods and
techniques that legal practitioners must be able to employ.” (citations omitted)).

35.

See generally West, supra note 18, at 27-28.

36.

See Meadow-Menkel, supra note 3, at 567.

37.

See West, supra note 18, at 126-28.
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as it once was, then the ways in which courses are still taught in that tradition
have also been called into question.38
Both of these observations often fuel practice-ready criticisms from outside
the walls of the academy, and especially from within the profession, because
Langdell’s formalist concept of the law do not entirely reflect the nature of law
practice today.39 For example, the recent report from the newly formed ABA
Task Force on the Future of Legal Education that weighed in on the current
turmoil in legal education typifies this practice-oriented criticism by noting
that “the core purpose common to all law schools is to prepare individuals to
provide legal and related services in a professionally responsible fashion”40 and
that “[t]his elementary fact is often minimized.”41 Consequently, the task force’s
report prompted a call for more that law schools should do “toward developing
the competencies and professionalism required of people who will deliver
services to clients.”42 Other examples from the practicing bar have emerged
in droves in recent years.43 Without systemic change, that observation, in the
meantime, collides with the traditional case method.44 Langdell’s original
obsession with defining a “learned profession” resulted in a model of teaching
and learning that reflects the “learned” within the phrase, but often misses
38.

See Elizabeth Mertz, The Language of Law School: Learning to “Think Like A Lawyer”
26 (2007) (stating that Langdell “linked this method for teaching with an overall substantive
theory of law, predicated on the idea that there are foundational legal principles, analogous
to scientific law, that are discernable through analysis of the raw data of appellate cases.”).
Mertz also describes the criticism of the case method: “There have been numerous critiques
of Langdell’s formalist philosophy and pedagogical system—most notably from the legal
realist school of the 1930s, which also pressed for more clinical education in law schools, and
more recently from critical scholars within the legal academy. However, despite a number
of arguably successful attacks on the substantive underpinnings of Langdell’s approach, the
method itself appears to have outlasted its theoretical rationale.” Id. (citations omitted)).

39.

See Reed, supra note 1. The most recently famous of these criticisms from beyond the citadel
of the legal academy has been the series of articles that The New York Times has written. See,
e.g., David Segal, What They Don’t Teach Law Students: Lawyering, N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 2011
(associating Langdell’s case method with lack of practical knowledge taught in law schools:
“Mr. Langdell introduced ‘case method,’ which is the short answer to the question ‘What
does law school teach you if not how to be a lawyer?’ This approach cultivates a student’s
capacity to reason and all but ignores the particulars of practice.”).

40.

Final Report, 2014 A.B.A. Task Force on Legal Education 1, 3, http://www.
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/report_
and_recommendations_of_aba_task_force.authcheckdam.pdf [hereinafter Task Force
Report].

41.

Id.

42.

Id.

43.

See, e.g., Eunice Park, Legal Education: Integrating Practical Skills into the Curriculum, Orange
County Law, June 2014, at 16 (2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers/
cfm?abstract_id=2446354..

44.

See, e.g., Kristen Holmquist, Challenging Carnegie, 61 J. Legal Educ. 353, 366 (2011) (arguing
that the case method “diminish[es] students’ ability to think about the knotty relationship
among facts and culture and clients and law.”).
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the “profession” that the adjective “learned.”45 It also juxtaposes a dichotomy
between learned and non-learned.46 In essence, Langdell’s method achieved
and delivered us a vision of lawyering, but one that is not receptive to the
realities of the profession.47 So in a very pervasive sense, there is a mismatch.48
What would reconcile this mismatch is for the curriculum and pedagogy of
law schools to incorporate the transfer of learning legal knowledge—in essence,
what is acquired in the course of study—into instrumentality within a life in
the law—essentially, practice that would produce the engaged professional.49
“Transfer of learning” is a concept in education theory representing the
process by which we “transfer our previous learning and experience in order to
more quickly and efficiently learn a new skill.”50 But, unfortunately, awareness
of transfer is exactly what the potential for hierarchies in Langdell’s method
hinders.51 In fact, any effort to build transfer of learning into the law school
experience is overshadowed by hierarchy because essentially the method and
its continuing remnants marginalize the skills teaching that would otherwise
be instrumental.52
45.

See Task Force Report, supra note 40.

46.

See Robert Rubinson, A Theory of Access to Justice, 29 J. Legal Prof. 89, 124 (2004) (discussing
implications of viewing law as learned profession upon accessing justice in poverty contexts).

47.

See Spencer, supra note 34, at 1975 (“Langdell believed that law was a form of natural science
in that it consisted of a coherent system of rules derived from general principles that could
only be discerned through the study of observable phenomena—the judicial opinions in
which the principles were manifested.” (citations omitted)); see also id. at 2018 (“Indeed, the
numerous shortcomings of the American model of legal education have been documented
extensively: Law school does not routinely provide training in many of the practice skill
areas—such as drafting, counseling, planning, client development, and client management—
needed to be a successful practitioner . . . .” (citations omitted)).

48.

Unreceptive might be one way to put it. Obtuse might be another. Even a quick and
facetious glance at the phrase “think like a lawyer”—utterly Langdellian and emblematic—
shows the phrase for what it is: a simile that is slightly removed from what educating lawyers
should mean. Others have criticized it in its context as the historical motto for law teaching
and/or have replaced it with “what it means to be a lawyer” or at least “what lawyers do”
in order to recalibrate or further define the goal of educating and training lawyers. See, e.g.,
Bethany Rubin Henderson, Asking the Lost Question: What is the Purpose of Law School?, 53 J. Legal
Educ. 48, 58 (2003) (“A better way to understand what lawyers do is to look at the functions
lawyers actually perform. If we can define a set of lawyering functions, we can examine
them to see what types of skills and knowledge they require. Those clusters of skills and
knowledge constitute the functional elements of thinking like a lawyer.”).

49.

See Stuckey et al., supra note 1, at 28 (”The school is committed to preparing its students to
practice law effectively and responsibly in the contexts they are likely to encounter as new
lawyers.”).

50.

Robert E. Haskell, Transfer of Learning: Cognition, Instruction, and Reasoning 24
(2001).

51.

See Tonya Kowalski, True North: Navigating For the Transfer of Learning in Legal Education, 34 Seattle
U. L. Rev. 51, 76-79 (2010) (characterizing Langdell’s model for law schools as “a temple of
knowledge” that as a consequence imparted little on developing practical skills).

52.

Kennedy, supra note 7, at 596 (“[T]he teaching of skills in the mystified context of legal
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The current incarnation of the case method marginalizes skills most vividly
through the way doctrinal courses stack knowledge over skills instruction.53
For instance, instead of a possibly more egalitarian approach among courses,
the first-year curriculum will likely have four or five doctrinal courses—with
each course ranging in credits worth three to six units—juxtaposed against one
introductory course on legal research and writing that is most often capped
at two units worth of credits.54 Law school curricula are not immune from
the phenomenon of the hidden curriculum, where indirect messages about
its education model can be extracted from the way the curriculum presents
the law school’s offerings, whether these messages are deliberate or not.55 The
messages seem clear. After the first year, and when students are left to plan
their second- and third-year courses, they enter that part of their law school
career already with an ingrained preference for doctrinal courses over skills or
experience courses.56
Where the traditional law school model does not openly marginalize
skills—in moments when it does spotlight them—often it is only a limited set
of skills explored in a disconnected way.57 The typical set of skills explored by
reasoning about utterly connected legal problems means that skills are taught badly,
unselfconsciously, to be absorbed by osmosis as picks up the knack of ‘thinking like a
lawyer.’”).
53.

See Duncan Kennedy, Introduction, 73 UMKC L. Rev. 231, 232 (2004) (discussing incidentally
the relative perceptions of academic support faculty in ranking among other skills faculties—
legal writing in particular—in a more general discussion about the historical hierarchy
between casebook/doctrinal faculty versus legal writing).

54.

See David S. Romantz, The Truth About Cats and Dogs: Legal Writing Courses and the Law School
Curriculum, 52 U. Kan. L. Rev. 105, 135-36 (2003) (noting that a 2002 ALWD survey reported
that “first-year required legal writing courses averaged two credits in the fall term and two
credits in the spring term–significantly less than the average first-year doctrinal course—and
some law schools reported only one credit for each semester.”).

55.

See David M. Moss, The Hidden Curriculum of Legal Education: Toward a Holistic Model for Reform,
2013 J. Disp. Resol. 19, 20 (2013) (“The problem with the Langdellian model is not that
its subjects or methods are inappropriate, but rather that they convey seriously distorted
messages about law and lawyers and therefore fail to convey additional needed information
and skills. These messages are mostly implicit in the structure of law school courses,
erroneously suggesting that the bulk of what lawyers do is to analyze and argue appellate
law and that other functions are less common or important. The implicit nature of these
messages, which are repeatedly reinforced in multiple courses, conveys a powerful subliminal
lesson.” (citations omitted)).

56.

See Melissa Marlow-Shafer, Student Evaluation of Teacher Performance and the “Legal Writing
Pathology:” Diagnosis Confirmed, 5 N.Y. City L. Rev. 115, 132 (2002) (drawing a correlation
between lower prestige of legal writing courses in law schools and the number of credits
assigned to legal writing courses).

57.

See Deborah Zalesne & David Nadvorney, Why Don’t They Get It?: Academic Intelligence and the
Under-Prepared Student As “Other”, 61 J. Legal Educ. 264, 271 (2011) (“Of course, most legal
reasoning skills and at least case briefing are taught explicitly at most law schools in separate
legal research and writing and ‘lawyering’ courses. Typically, however, neither faculty nor
students consider the skills learned in these courses as transferrable to their doctrinal classes.
In addition, some academic skills, such as close case reading and note taking, and some legal
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Langdell’s case method is one that exemplifies formalist approaches to the
law.58 Viewing the completeness of the common law tradition, in-class inquiry
into scientifically discovering the law through the Socratic dialogue often
loads the examination with only a limited set of skills, mostly those dominated
by analogical and syllogistic reasoning.59 As Philip Kissam has observed, there
is a tendency for “the discipline’s subtle promotion of a particular intellectual
method at the cost of devaluing other intellectual methods that in legal
practices will complement and at times compete with the favored method.”60
According to Kissam, that “favored method is the method of analysis, that is
the mental practice and instinct of breaking things down and dividing them
into many small discrete and useful parts”61 and that “[o]ne consequence of
the discipline’s analytical tendency is the tacit disfavoring of other intellectual
methods such as the interpretation or synthesis of complex legal materials and
construction of complex or novel legal arguments.”62 Such favoring of one
“intellectual method” is read by Kissam as a “devaluation” that he notes as
“worrisome.”63
Similarly, Robin West has also characterized the kind of limited analytical
and reasoning skills that law schools teach to the exclusion of others, calling
out in particular two types of reasoning—first, “processual fairness,” where
students recognize processes in the law that utilize a sense of basic fairness to
accomplish legal goals,64 and, second, “horizontal equity,” where students learn
how to analyze cases analogically to treat like cases alike.65 Overemphasis of
these two types of analysis contributes to the teaching of a kind of “legalism”
that West claims is detrimental because it overshadows the ability of students
to sense other things about the law, such as justice.66
Both Kissam and West’s views on the analytical skills taught in the Langdell
case method appear as a self-contained (and perhaps overly self-confident) set
of skills that cabined by the nature of the case method. West notes openly
reasoning skills, such as issue spotting, tend to be overlooked, even in courses with a skills
focus.” (citations omitted)).
58.

See generally Katherine R. Kruse, Legal Education and Professional Skills: Myths and Misconceptions
About Theory and Practice, 45 McGeorge L. Rev. 7 (2013).

59.

See Nancy Cook, Law As Science: Revisiting Langdell’s Paradigm in the 21st Century, 88 N.D. L. Rev.
21, 34 (2012) (describing how “Socratic questioning provides students with opportunities
to draw distinctions and analogies, reconcile apparently inconsistent judgments, and make
judgments about the soundness of legal reasoning”).

60.

Kissam, supra note 8, at 6.

61.

Id.

62.

Id. (citations omitted).

63.

See id.

64.

West, supra note 18, at 48-50.

65.

Id. at 50.

66.

See id. at 51-55.
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that “pedagogically, formalists viewed legal education as an education in
the virtues and content of the common law: by reading hundreds of cases
in every common law subject, and nothing else, the student would come
to learn through immersion, both the content of the law and the art of its
interpretation.”67 In this way, Langdell’s case method for studying law, as West
has hermetically described it, would presuppose that a limited set of analytical
skills would prevail even if a student had to take on novel issues in the law.68
For if all the legal principles and truths required by the law are preserved in the
body of cases that we have inherited from the common law, then even disputes
arising under cases of first impression, involving never-been-seen-before facts,
only need a look back at the right precedence—using the predominant set of
analytical skills—for a contemporary resolution.69 Perhaps this notion is the
same “devaluation” that worries Kissam.70
Another analytical or critical reasoning skill that is emphasized, perhaps to
the exclusion of others, is logic upon which the law is built.71 The satisfaction
of mastery here brings a sense of accomplishment and intellectual rigorousness
that exaggeratedly justifies its prominence.72 But otherwise, the Socratic
inquiry and teaching of case law reduces examination of skills from what could
be a fuller pantheon of legal reasoning skills that could reflect a modern-day
concept of law practice to a formalist bundle of skills that mirror the vogue of
former law thinking and an incomplete image of law and law practice.73
67.

Id. at 74 n.70.

68.

See id.

69.

See id. at 101-02 (describing how in Langdell’s ideals, “Law simply is that body of principles
that comes to us from the past, making possible the full resolution of all possible legal
questions.” and that “[f]or that to be possible, the principles by which novel questions are
answered must be a full and complete set, and must be inferable from well-settled texts and
those well-settled texts are virtually by necessity common law cases.”).

70.

See Kissam, supra note 8, at 6 (“This devaluation appears, for example, in the apparent passion
of many lawyers for focusing on the details of things without providing any conceptual or
ethical understanding of their actions and statements.”).

71.

Andrea Kayne Kaufman, The Logician Versus the Linguist—An Empirical Tale of Functional Discrimination
in the Legal Academy, 8 Mich. J. Gender & L. 247, 252-53 (2001) (“Most law schools emphasize
logical intelligence in the evaluation of students as well. Many first-year courses evaluate
students using standard bluebook examinations. These timed tests require students to ‘issue
spot’ and apply the holdings of appellate decisions from their case books to a complex set
of facts and to use the logic of precedential reasoning to predict possible legal outcomes.
This logical testing has been criticized for ignoring the importance of creative synthesis and
‘legal imagination,’ disregarding ‘practical judgments,’ and ‘not adequately reflect[ing] all
the types of intelligence that the successful lawyer needs.’ While ignored by a significant
proportion of law school education, particularly the first-year courses, the other intelligences
are integral to the varied and multifaceted roles of lawyering.”) (citing Philip C. Kissam, Law
School Examinations, 42 Vand. L. Rev. 433, 456-57 (1989)).

72.

See West, supra note 18, at 56 (“Law schools inculcate in students an appreciation for the
importance of evenhanded treatment under law[.]”).

73.

See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Narrowing the Gap by Narrowing the Field: What’s Missing from the
MacCrate Report—of Skills, Legal Science and Being a Human Being, 69 Wash. L. Rev. 593, 595 (1994)
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Other than limited analytical skills, Kissam also suggests that law schools
teach narrowly the skills peripheral to legal reasoning, such as reading
and writing that are fundamental to lawyering: “The discipline teaches
instrumentalist habits of reading and writing that both empower and limit
future lawyers. These habits consist of quick, productive but often superficial
ways of reading legal texts and writing about law[.]”74 More specifically,
Kissam says “[s]tudents must engage in quick if superficial analysis and
write precisely but quickly, especially if they hope to obtain one of the few
high grades that are allowed by grading curves.”75 Oral rhetoric, as noted
by Kissam and others, is another heavily emphasized lawyering skill that is
taught at the exclusion of other, more transactional lawyering skills, and that
reaffirms the doctrine-skills hierarchy created by the Langdellian preference
for case law.76 Elizabeth Mertz has noted as well the oral rhetoric emphasis
and what is conveyed and accomplished by it in law classrooms—all of which
filtered directly into our established pedagogical traditions.77 These different
observations of the limited skills set taught in law schools suggest that skills
teaching has strong ties to the way in which the case method studies the law,
but that focusing too much on such a small set of skills imparts only a partial
impression of the experience of law practice.
The lack of awareness of how legal knowledge is transferred to practice in the
face of hierarchy of form over skills sets up a faulty (or negligible) dichotomy
for law students when they enter into the real world of law firms and clients.78
(mentioning “the false dualism of so-called intellectual rigor in legal ideas and ‘science’ and
the presumed ‘weakness’ of skills training by demonstrating that both theory and skills are
‘legal science’ and rigorous, and both are also incomplete and partial statements of what a
lawyer needs to know.”).
74.

Kissam, supra note 8, at 7.

75.

Id. at 55.

76.

See id. at 7 (mentioning how law school discipline emphasize habits indicative of “[t]he law
school’s distinctive oral culture, which celebrates oral heroism and tacitly devalues complex
reading and writing.”).

77.

See Mertz, supra note 38, at 94 (summarizing how students in law schools “are being trained
to a common language: a new kind of reading, writing, and talking” that is structured in a
way that “relies on constant filtering of conflicting stories through the lens of legal-textual
authority.”).

78.

See Anne Marie Cavazos, Next Phase Pedagogy Reform for the Twenty-First Century Legal Education:
Delivering Competent Lawyers for a Consumer-Driven Market, 45 Conn. L. Rev. 1113, 1144-45 (2012)
(“Since the late 1800s and early 1900s, legal education has been centered on theoretical
and historical education rather than a combination of a theory/history and skill-oriented
education model. This focus has produced many problems. When legal education shifted
away from apprenticeships, law students were no longer being taught how to apply legal
knowledge to resolve practical problems. In addition, law graduates may lack the ability to
understand social problems and assist clients holistically by moving away from specialization
of subject matter that limits legal education. Cross-training students in legal areas and
equipping them to be responsive to the client’s non-legal concerns is imperative in today’s
society. To promote higher competency of law students upon graduation, a skills-oriented
pedagogy must be integrated into legal education so that a hands-on or clinical approach is
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Making this observation at a time when those examining the new normal are
finding that the student competency with skills—even academic skills—are at an
all-time low requires a need for transfer of learning to demonstrate and impart
skills in the classroom, particularly through active learning experiences.79 What
would result otherwise is a limited engagement with practice in the classroom
for our students.
In education theory, scholarly discussion about curricula in different learning
settings has included ways to set up curricula that facilitate how knowledge
acquired in the classroom transfers into the skills development of outside the
classroom.80 In that regard, the Langdellian model underserves rather than
underscores this transfer. If the traditional law school curriculum remains
exclusively knowledge-driven,81 then there will be limited opportunities for
transfer of skills development in a career that depends more on the practice
than the acquisition of knowledge.82 It is probably impossible for law schools
to accommodate the hyperbolic level of practice-readiness that the profession
has demanded.83 No three-year program can inculcate students for every law
practice permutation so that they will be a workforce of covert and seasoned
attorneys on their first day of practice, and to buy into this notion is foolhardy.84
offered from day one.”).
79.

See Gerald F. Hess, Principle 3: Good Practice Encourages Active Learning, 49 J. Legal Educ. 401, 402
(1999) (“[A]ctive learning is more than a set of techniques. It is also an orientation on the
part of students and teachers. It includes a belief that legal education should help students
understand legal concepts and theory, improve critical thinking, and develop professional
skills and values. It seeks to focus students not only on what they are learning but how they
are learning as well. Finally, an active learning orientation proceeds from the assumption
that students learn best when they take responsibility for their own education.” (citations
omitted)).

80.

See generally Kowalski, supra note 51, at 68-77 (discussing the different models of learning and
their effectiveness in creating transfer of knowledge to the student and how such studies
would impact the law school model, which Kowalski identifies as a model that would fall
within a classical approach).

81.

See Timothy W. Floyd, Legal Education and the Vision Thing, 31 Ga. L. Rev. 853, 855 (1996) (“At
most law schools the curriculum and pedagogy appear to embody a belief in one of two
purposes: either to teach students a body of knowledge, that is, the ‘law’; or to teach students
a certain type of analysis called ‘thinking like lawyers.’”).

82.

See id. at 856 (“The basic law school curriculum, however, still largely ignores the practice
of law. The current curriculum does not give students much of a picture of the world of law
practice.”).

83.

James E. Moliterno, A Way Forward for an Ailing Legal Education Model, 17 Chap. L. Rev. 73, 76
(2013) (in describing reforms at Washington and Lee School of Law the term “practice-ready”
is tempered as an end-goal expectation: “The ‘practice-ready’ term has been thrown around
a lot and I think it is too high a hurdle for any law school to expect to leap. It is unrealistic to
think that a three-year JD can produce law graduates who are like third-, fourth-, or fifth-year
attorneys. That is not going to happen in the time we have and with the resources we have.
But we can give students a head start on their development.”).

84.

Perhaps a more realistic solution to the competency training of students has been the rise of
law school incubators, which are still experimental at this time. See Genevieve Blake Tung,
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However, it is not impossible to help students develop skills of legal reasoning
and even gain some practice-based experience that allows them to transition
into a life in the law more smoothly—in essence to transfer knowledge into
practice. In short, the new normative within legal education, regardless of
what model we use, is to invite active learning experiences that coincide both
with the theoretical and practical concepts of the law—active learning that
evens out the playing field between doctrine and skills.85
In writing about transfer of learning in the law school context, Tonya
Kowalski draws from educational theories about transfer of learning to
observe that to facilitate transfer the instructor must understand that the
knowledge imparted in law schools should encompass more than just doctrinal
legal knowledge.86 Kowalski explains that the knowledge we teach should
also be procedural, strategic, and conditional, and then she describes them
accordingly:87
Procedural knowledge is simply “how-to” knowledge. Students learn how to
formulate an IRAC analysis, how to file and serve a complaint, how to brief
a case, and even how to outline and study for exams. Strategic knowledge
focuses on understanding our own mental processes, such as how to acquire
new information and skills. For legal education, this can be expanded to
include strategic thinking about research, reasoning, advocacy, negotiation,
and client relations. Finally, conditional knowledge is the experience and
understanding to know what types of knowledge are called for in varied
contexts.88

All of these kinds of non-doctrinal knowledge serve functional needs for the
law student to become the active professional; and therein lies the importance
of transfer.
To accomplish transfer while we still adhere to the Langdellian tradition is to
subvert the hierarchy of form over function. It is possible if we can expand the
pedagogy of teaching law students to embrace a method that enables transfer
of learning that results in students acquiring the law and then knowing what
to do with it more effectively.89 A fundamental transition in the model of law
teaching and learning90 should, of course, strive for actively teaching practice
Academic Law Libraries and the Crisis in Legal Education, 105 Law Libr. J. 275, 297-99 (2013).
85.

See Stuckey et al., supra note 1, at 132-33 (advocating that effective teaching in law schools
should be more “multi-modal” and less reliant on Socratic and case method dialogues).

86.

See Kowalski, supra note 51, at 81 (“The required knowledge base includes not only rote and
critically reflective understanding, but also other forms of knowledge . . . .”).

87.

Id.

88.

Id.

89.

See id. at 64 (proposing that students can reap benefits from seeing the kinds of transferable
knowledge and active learning skills that are emphasized in the transfer method of learning).

90.

See Pistone & Hoeffner, supra note 19, at 227 (“Change is coming; the only choice for legal
educators is whether they will act early and creatively enough to make the post-Langdellian
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alongside teaching knowledge without the impediment of a false hierarchy
that marginalizes one component over another in the life of the law.91 Still
for now, while we wait for the new normal to be defined,92 there are ways of
bringing skills acquisition into the law classroom that avoids having to combat
institutional grievances head-on and manages to further a coup d’état over the
dominance of form. The rest of this article will explain such a method.
III. Destablizing The Hierarchy, or Succotash over Steak
On the morning of April 4, 2014, just before the Igniting Law Teaching
conference was to begin, a colleague from another law school who had sat
through my run-through during rehearsal commented on how my idea for
expanding active learning in my doctrinal classes reminded her of the
sneaky ways a parent would try to hide fruits and vegetables onto a finicky
child’s dinner plate. Yet skills—like succotash—need not be given a position
subordinate to meat or doctrinal knowledge in the balance of all things related
to competency. And so, the goal of my method is to elevate skills teaching so
that it rises closer to the level of doctrinal teaching while making sure that
the elevation escapes detection—resulting in an invisible blend of both so that
students, finicky or not, do not realize that they are acquiring skills at the same
time they are learning the law, or are not bothered by it if they do. Instead,
the blend of both skills and doctrinal knowledge in the classroom should be
seamless—lest they figure out what they are getting and then decide, based on
their previous biases, to excise skills learning to their yet-unrealized detriments.
To so do, I have taken a page from those who teach law school academic
support and deal with the doctrine-skills hierarchy in their jobs daily, but who
try to avoid breaking the golden rule of academic support etiquette—a rule that,
if it does not exemplify hierarchy, at least displays territoriality. When I began
teaching in law school as an academic support instructor, one of the towering
rules to obey, for better or worse, was to avoid treading on the domain of the
doctrinal law professors as far as what to teach to students in academic support
courses.93 Of course, this rule shows the divide (or hierarchy) between skills
law school an improvement in terms of the quality of education provided—i.e., to make
it a law school that finally remedies the deficiencies that Reed and his successors have
highlighted for almost a century.”).
91.

See Stuckey et al., supra note 1, at 73 (“Law schools cannot prepare students for practice
unless they teach doctrine, theory, and practice as part of a unified, coordinated program of
instruction.” (citation omitted)).

92.

See, e.g., Jan Bissett & Margi Heinen, Facing the New Normal, 92 Mich. B.J. 52 (2013); Philip J.
Weiser, Professionalism and the New Normal, 42 Colo. Law. 49 (2013).

93.

Ellen Yankiver Suni, Academic Support at the Crossroads: From Minority Retention to Bar Prep and
Beyond—Will Academic Support Change Legal Education or Itself Be Fundamentally Changed?, 73 UMKC
L. Rev. 497, 504-05 (2004) (describing that in many law schools, “academic support
professionals know they must be careful not to appear as if they are encroaching into the
domain of the doctrinal faculty, especially avoiding being viewed as attempting to interfere
with the classroom of the doctrinal faculty.” (citations omitted)).
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and knowledge among faculty,94 but also it reflects pedagogical values as well.95
In other words, tasked with having to be both complementary and effective,
academic support instructors teach skills that deal with the law and not the
legal knowledge of it.96 For this, many professors who teach academic support
often build access points in their academic support courses where they leave
the doctrine untouched, but instruct on the practice of law or on a skill of legal
reasoning to enhance student competency in doctrinal courses.97 My approach
today varies from this restriction to doctrine in a much more liberated sense.
What my particular borrowing from academic support practices has rendered
is a three-step approach for elevating skills with doctrine in my law courses.
It is an approach that has helped me find, examine, and develop those access
points and work them into the doctrinal narrative of my courses to facilitate
teaching and learning the law alongside skills—or sometimes even through
them. In its more or less laboratory incantation, the three steps to elevating
skills into the doctrinal classroom require the instructor to (1) find a connection
between legal reasoning skills and doctrine (what I call mimesis), (2) ensure
the relevance of the skill, and (3) build an opportunity in the classroom for
students to discover both skills and doctrine. I will explain these steps in detail
accordingly.
A. Step One: Discovering Mimesis
The first step in elevating skills seamlessly to match the concentration of
doctrinal teaching is to find a particular connection between a certain doctrine
and a legal reasoning skill that could be used to practice it. Here the instructor
searches for ways that the doctrine displays itself through a particular skill set.
I call this mimesis—borrowing the term from literary and critical traditions to
distill the process of finding a quality in the way the law is presented, whether
in its content or context, that has potential to be imitative or “mimetic” of a
particular aspect of lawyering—i.e., skill.
The term “mimesis”—without waxing too metaphysically over it—has been
defined within aesthetics as a concept in language and art that characterizes
94.

See id. at 499 (“However, at its core academic support has the potential to threaten existing
hierarchies in legal education.”) (citing Kristine Knaplund & Richard H. Sander, The Art and
Science of Academic Support, 45 J. Legal Educ. 157, 159 (1995)).

95.

See id. at 500-01 (“While overlap exists between the goals and methods of traditional
legal education and academic support, the two models present significant differences in
philosophy and approach. Furthermore, in many respects, academic support directly
challenges the soundness of much of the pedagogy of traditional legal education as well
as the fairness and propriety of making students adapt to one fairly standard model of
teaching.” (citations omitted)).

96.

See id. at 504-05.

97.

See, e.g., Adam G. Todd, Exam Writing as Legal Writing: Teaching and Critiquing Law School
Examination Discourse, 76 Temp. L. Rev. 69 (2003) (recognizing the “status quo” that is the
constructed hierarchy between skills and doctrinal instruction in legal education and
advocating for legal writing courses to embrace academic support teaching of exam writing
to help further student competency).
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both the imitation of nature as object, phenomenon, and process, and more
broadly as a form of artistic representation.98 For this method, I resort to the
former definition and not the latter, looking toward the intertextuality between
the law that is presented and a skill (or skills) that would usher that law into
reality, meaning practice. Because law is fundamentally language-based,99 and
mimesis has been a concept that has partially dealt with the gestures of language
in imitating nature,100 mimesis does have its place in the interpretation of law
and in observing the performative aspects of practicing the law,101 essentially
accomplishing what the law represented by language intends to do. In the
broadest sense, the performative aspect of the law is easiest to glean from what
the law can do to individuals.102 But the performativity of the law can, as I see
it, also have implications for those who practice the law as well.
But theory aside, in this first step, what the law teacher must ask herself
in relation to a particular legal doctrine that she is about to teach can be
articulated much more simply: Does the law, or the way it is often presented, exhibit a
practical or legal reasoning skill for examination? In other words, through a discovery
of mimesis I consider the nature of a doctrine or how presentation of that
doctrine avails itself particularly to showing us some sort of skill. Again, the
idea of the law exhibiting some mimetic attributes for instruction should
not be entirely unfamiliar—as, arguably, Langdell’s idea that the common
law tradition was a complete and autonomous system was itself a mimetic
observation imprinted into the way Langdell designed law instruction.103 The
difference might be that Langdell’s formalist vision might have prompted an
outmoded or arguably incomplete characterization that then trickled into the
98.

See Erich Auerbach, Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western Literature
11-12, 23 (Willard Trask trans., Princeton Univ. Press 2003) (1974).

99.

See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 459-60 (1896) (“The
law is full of phraseology drawn from morals, and by the mere force of language continually
invites us to pass from one domain to the other without perceiving it, as we are sure to do
unless we have the boundary constantly before our minds.”).

100. See Arne Melberg, Theories of Mimesis 21-23 (1995).
101. See Martha Merrill Umphrey, Law in Drag: Trials and Legal Performativity, 21 Colum. J. Gender
& L. 114 (2011) (discussing performativity in the practice of law).
102. See generally Kenji Yoshino, Covering: The Hidden Assault on Our Civil Rights (2006).
103. See Gary Minda, One Hundred Years of Modern Legal Thought: From Langdell and Holmes to Posner and
Schlag, 28 Ind. L. Rev. 353, 360 (1994) (explaining the logical flow of Langdell’s ideas about
law and legal studies: “If law could be a science, then legal studies could be approached
from the ‘scientific perspective’ required for laboratory experiments testing the validity of
a hypothesis. Law professors, following Langdell’s vision of legal science, could claim that
the law could be analyzed as a system consisting of a set of universal principles, policies, and
rules. The reduction of law to scientific concepts systematized by an abstract general method
also rendered legal apprenticeship largely obsolete as a means for professional law training,
since it was now thought that law students no longer needed to study law as a practice; all
that one needed was a classroom, casebooks, and a teacher trained in the Socratic method of
instruction.” (citations omitted)).
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way law has been since taught.104 By contrast, the method here for identifying
mimesis is not infiltrated by that kind of broad ambitious vision, but examines
and mines each teachable doctrine microscopically for teachable skills that
help bring that doctrine to life in practice and closer to transfer of doctrinal
knowledge.
Not only does finding such a pairing help identify the interrelatedness
between a particular legal knowledge and some type of lawyerly skill, but
it is also the key to knowing where the access points begin for skills. For
instance, in Contracts, a complex rule that is presented in statutory form, such
as the dreaded section 2-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code105—otherwise
known as the “battle of the forms,106 imparts very noticeable opportunities for
teaching students the importance of statutory reading and interpretation. The
way that section 2-207 is hermetically presented, with its three subsections,107
while allowing many different scenarios to be reached during the formation
of modern commercial deal making, gives the instructor opportunity to
teach the doctrine by explicitly teaching skills of statutory interpretation and
construction—especially while negotiating among the language of section
2-207, its official comments,108 and some pertinent fact patterns involving
contract making.
In addition, the level of technicality within section 2-207 affords another
moment of mimesis for teaching a subsequent lesson, particularly for success
104. See generally Menkel-Meadow, supra note 3, at 563-68 (describing legal realist responses to
Langdell’s formalism and case method).
105. “§ 2-207 (1)-(3). Additional Terms in Acceptance or Confirmation.
(1) A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written confirmation
which is sent within a reasonable time operates as an acceptance even though it states terms
additional to or different from those offered or agreed upon, unless acceptance is expressly
made conditional on assent to the additional or different terms.
(2) The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to the
contract. Between merchants such terms become part of the contract unless:
(a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer;
(b) they materially alter it; or
(c) notification of objection to them has already been given or is given within
a reasonable time after notice of them is received.
(3) Conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of a contract is
sufficient to establish a contract for sale although the writings of the parties do not otherwise
establish a contract. In such case the terms of the particular contract consist of those terms on
which the writings of the parties agree, together with any supplementary terms incorporated
under any other provisions of this Act. UCC § 2-207(1)-(3).”
106. See Colin P. Marks, Not What, But When Is an Offer: Rehabilitating the Rolling Contract, 46 Conn. L.
Rev. 73, 80-81 (2013) (“Legal realism, also called neo-classicism, abandons contract law as a
rigid set of rules in favor of a softer approach that tries to understand how contracts work in
the real world. Legal realism is at the heart of provisions such as U.C.C. section 2-207’s battle
of the forms, which departed from the common law’s mirror image rule approach to offers
and counter-offers.”) (citations omitted).
107. U.C.C. § 2-207 (1)-(3), supra note 105.
108. See U.C.C. § 2-207, Official Comments (2000).
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on law school exams. Such rule-driven technicality with section 2-207 works
well for testing the doctrine through multiple-choice questions—since multiplechoice questions lend themselves easily to testing technically dense rules and
concepts109—and therefore, showing students how to handle multiple-choice
exams in law school. Here then, we see the presentation of the law (i.e., statutory
material) translates into an opportunity for teaching legal competency skills
(i.e., statutory reading and interpretation) that has further potential to be
filtered into problem-solving skills for a particular testing format (multiplechoice exams).
The transfer here from legal knowledge to exam taking is reminiscent of the
plight of the lawyer who must internalize the law and then practice in various
settings, whether in the courtroom, in written analysis, or in transactional
situations. Also, this resembles very much the procedural and conditional
knowledge in Haskell’s transfer theory as Kowalski has articulated.110 Likewise,
a first-year Torts course could also feature a less complicated but a similar
example of mimesis by examining section 402A in the Restatement (Second)
of Torts, the provision governing strict liability for harm caused by sellers,111
where the instructor could show students how to break down the two difficult
subprovisions into a set of required elements that are more easily manageable
for a lawyer to graft onto a set of facts. Instead of teaching multiple-choice testtaking skills here, however, the lesson on 402A here could be used to teach
students how to organize and “deconstruct” even complex rule provisions into
simpler bite-size pieces for thorough analysis and organization on an essay
exam.
Another illustration of mimesis here can be seen in a first-year Criminal
Law course, where the use of common law rule for burglary often requires the
ability for simple rule synthesis. The element of felonious intent in burglary
requires the practitioner to synthesize rules from a felonious crime generally.112
Two observations for teaching skills can be taught from this illustration. First,
the combination of a rule for a property crime has to be paired accurately with
a rule for a specific-intent felony for it to be correctly used for issue spotting
and analyzing a set of facts for burglary. So a rule synthesis lesson can be given,
involving rules for battery and a specific-intent felony and even the use and
combination of different case law precedence within those rules. Second, there
is also an opportunity for teaching more broadly the complex relationships of
rules and cases and the importance of synthesizing rules with demonstrative
cases quickly.113 Although legal writing courses teach rule synthesis explicitly,
109. See Janet W. Fisher, Multiple-Choice: Choosing the Best Options for More Effective and Less Frustrating Law
School Testing, 37 Cap. U. L. Rev. 119, 122-23 (2008) (“Law school multiple-choice questions,
by contrast, are intended to test mastery of legal rules and concepts.”).
110. See Kowalski, supra note 51, at 81.
111.

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965).

112. Charles E. Torcia, 3 Wharton’s Criminal Law § 316 (15th ed. 1993).
113.

See, e.g., Deborah A. Schmedemann & Christina L. Kunz, Synthesis: Legal Reading,
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it helps students to see the same skill working in a doctrinal course to reinforce
the importance of acquiring such skills.114
Further, the vagueness in the drafting or presentation of a doctrine can
also offer several mimetic observations about legal practice and reasoning. For
instance, in Torts, the phrase “offensive contact”—an element in a seemingly
simple battery rule115—offers a lot of opportunity to play with the facts.
Students must learn to closely read and argue from a set of facts to see whether
a series of events could contextualize an act to become a touching that would
be reasonably offensive. Developing a methodology for closely reading facts
based on a relatively vague rule could prove helpful. For example:
A suffers from a heart condition and frequently takes nitroglycerin pills to
open his arteries and relieve angina pain. B, A’s attendant, seeking to hasten
A’s death, places a book on A’s night table blocking A’s view so that he cannot
easily find his nitro pills. A awakes in the middle of the night suffering chest
pain and cannot locate his pills. Minutes later he suffers a heart attack and
dies. Has B committed an intentional tort?116

Could the heart attack caused in part by B’s act of intentionally placing the
book with the desire to hasten death be an offensive touching for battery?
Certainly B’s moving of the book was an intentional physical act that set in
motion some sort of eventual harm (a heart attack, which physiologically
could be argued as a contact by persuasively characterizing such symptoms
accordingly, or at least an attempt could be made to do so117).
Similarly, in Constitutional Law, the vagueness of rules and terms of art
and the change from one position to the complete opposite in Supreme
Court precedence can show students much about broadening and narrowing
holdings, but also much about the interplay between rules and policymaking.118
A good example could be with some of the canonical civil rights cases such
Reasoning, and Writing 36-42 (2007).
114. See Paul Figley, Teaching Rule Synthesis with Real Cases, 61 J. Legal Educ. 245, 245 (2011)
(describing the different classroom contexts in which rule synthesis can be used—from
doctrinal courses to clinics).
115.

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 18 (1965).

116. Aaron D. Twerski et al., Torts: Cases and Materials 67-68 (3d ed. 2012).
117.

The Mayo Clinic lists compression in the chest as, inter alia, one of the symptoms of a heart
attack: “This discomfort or pain can feel like a tight ache, pressure, fullness, or squeezing
in your chest lasting more than a few minutes.” Mayo Clinic, Heart Attack Symptoms: Know
What’s a Medical Emergency, (Jul. 25, 2014), http://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/
heart-attack/in-depth/heart-attack-symptoms/art-20047744.

118. See Robert C. Power, Strategies and Techniques for Teaching Constitutional Law 14
(2012).
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as Plessy v. Ferguson119 and Brown v. Board of Education,120 or Bowers v. Hardwick121 and
Lawrence v. Texas.122 The presentation of the law in those cases reflects broader
adjudicative and interpretative skills at play.
A final example of identifying mimesis is in the way the professor organizes
an entire body of law. The way doctrine and concepts are organized together
in a law course affords opportunities for skills development, whether it is
acquiring a knack for seeing subjects at the big-picture level or understanding
that the ability to conceptualize and organize a body of doctrine for a course
helps facilitate issue-spotting skills in practice.123 If a semester long course in
Torts is already organized by levels of culpability from purpose, desire, or
substantial certainty to a complete abandonment of intent (i.e., intentional
torts, negligence, strict liability, etc.),124 the topical nature of the course can
help a student spot a civil wrong and categorize it according to the appropriate
doctrine. A year-long Contracts course could be organized in a way that
exemplifies the linearity of contract claims (e.g., formation, breach, and
damages) to help students recognize that some bodies of substantive law could
be organized and learned within a progressive, linear narrative. In these ways,
the presentation of the law transfers mimetically into ways students see such
issues arise in reality. This same example translates particularly well for upperlevel capstone courses that may yoke two different subjects in an advanced
way, such as a course on the law of Remedies, which tries to discuss topics on
damages, equity, and restitution within torts and contracts subjects.125 As we
have seen here, the law by the way it is presented through language is very
fruitful in showing us the relationships to skills in the mode of practice and
demonstrating the critical use of mimesis in potential lessons pairing skills
and law.
B. Step Two: Finding Relevance
According to adult learning theory, adult learners tend to capture material
more readily and effectively if they find that there is some relevance to the
119. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
120. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
121. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
122. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
123. See, e.g., Dannye Holley, Specific Course and Class Planning Ideas: #1 Using the Syllabus as Course
Synthesis and Teaching Plan, in Gerald F. Hess & Steven Friedland, Techniques For Teaching
Law 29 (1999).
124. See, e.g., Marshall S. Shapo & Richard J. Peltz, Tort and Injury Law vii-xii (3d. ed. 2006).
The Table of Contents in Shapo & Peltz organizes the major torts according to culpability
standards.
125. See Caprice L. Roberts, Teaching Remedies from Theory to Practice, 57 St. Louis U. L.J. 713, 713
(2012) (“Remedies is about the intersection of things. Intellectual curiosity has always drawn
me to wonder how different, disparate things fit together. The Remedies course provides an
analytical framework to explore the varied goals of substantive doctrinal courses. It shows
how bodies of law connect.”).
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material.126 Examples from literature on legal writing and clinical teaching
reiterate how “[a]ccording to adult learning theory, students generally
learn more effectively when they understand what they are supposed to be
learning and how it will help them achieve personal goals.”127 The concept
of incorporating relevance seems intuitive and commonsensical if students
understands the “why” part of their learning experience and process and
can relate or find the purpose of the lesson useful, then they will receive that
instruction and learning with more weight.128
With that in mind, the theory behind the second step in my method is
to elevate skills acquisition in the doctrinal classroom by exemplifying the
relevance of skill to facilitate the previous step’s mimesis. In proceeding to
step two, I always evaluate whether the mimesis that I have located in step
one is helpful to my students currently in their careers in law school—for
understanding or learning doctrine or doing well in classes—or relevant for
lawyering in general. The prevalence of the millennial generation as law
students today, where just-in-time learning overshadows the just-in-case
learning habits of previous generations,129 prompts me to ensure that the legal
reasoning skills identified in the first step are timely for teaching to students in
my classes. If not, then I may abandon the lesson entirely and look for another
mimetic exchange between doctrine and skill, or I may look deeper to find a
hidden, subterranean connection to relevance that is not as readily apparent
at first glance.
For many introductory first-year courses, students who are caught off-guard
by having to deal with the legal gray areas of factual scenarios could easily
feel trepidation in classes. Extending the mimesis discussed above to the
vagueness of the language in “offensive contact” in a simple battery rule, the
student learning to deal with that vagueness would appreciate their relevance
if an instructor makes it clear that such gray areas help lawyers make creative
arguments. A lesson in Torts that draws on this mimesis and conveys relevance
126. See Malcolm S. Knowles et al., The Adult Learner: The Definitive Classic in Adult
Education and Human Resource Development 48 (7th ed. 2012) (“A person learns significantly
only those things that he perceives as being involved in the maintenance of, or enhancement of, the structure of self.
This hypothesis underlines the importance of making the learning relevant to the learner,
and puts into question the academic tradition of required courses.”).
127. Kele Stewart, How Much Clinic for How Many Students?: Examining the Decision to Offer Clinics for One
Semester or An Academic Year, 5 J. Marshall L.J. 1, 52 (2011).
128. See Linda S. Anderson, Incorporating Adult Learning Theory into Law School Classrooms: Small Steps
Leading to Large Results, 5 Appalachian J.L. 127, 143 (“According to those who have devoted
significant study to effective education, students learn more effectively when they can
see how what they are doing will be relevant to achieving their goals. Our students are
pragmatic. They are generally willing to work hard if they can see why they must do so
and what the benefit is to them. If they must learn specific skills in order to understand
more complex tasks, they are willing to do this, as long as we tell them why it is necessary.”)
(citations omitted).
129. See Joan C. Bohl, Generations X and Y in Law School: Practical Strategies for Teaching the MTV/Google
Generation, 54 Loy. L. Rev. 775, 781 (2008).
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of the skills taught could involve a doctrinal lesson that shows how the rule for
battery extends the requirement of offensive contact to include contact not just
directly of a person’s body, but of an item closely identified with a person’s
body, such as a portable but nondescript item, a pen or a plate.130 What the
mimesis here conveys is a need for skills to utilize the vagueness and work
through it to resolve a case.131
Another lesson in offensive touching of a person might be the ability to
use policy arguments to bolster the interpretation of a rule and its application.132
If the policy behind such a rule is to prevent unwanted violations of personal
space,133 then showing students how to match that policy with the rule to skew
the rule more favorably for one side might not only help them acquire a skill
of characterizing the law in situations where things could possibly go either
way, but also it might be a relevant skill for first-year Torts students who are
just starting to understand that part of a lawyer’s job is to find ambiguities and
then comfortably and creatively resolve them.
The above example of section 2-207 of the U.C.C is also helpful in this part
for explaining relevance.134 In an Evidence course, where a professor might
organize the separate legal doctrines as a series of legal threshold hurdles
building on each other to ensure the ultimate admissibility of an evidentiary
item, such presentation connotes to students a premium on transferring
doctrine to practice, and the relevance of that skill for an attorney who must
make litigation moves on the fly.135 In Civil Procedure, a lesson on personal
jurisdiction could also coincide with a demonstration of how factor-driven
tests are different from elemental rules in the way lawyers use them not only
help students learn the factors of “minimum contacts” but also how to use
130. Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 18, 19 (1965).
131.

A classic widely taught case here is Fisher v. Carousel Motor Hotel, 424 S.W. 2d 627 (Tex.
1967) where a restaurant manager’s confiscation of a plate from the grip of an AfricanAmerican engineer at the buffet line paired with epithets was considered an offensive contact
with an object that is closely identified with the body.

132. See id. at 629-30 (resorting to Restatement (Second) of Torts § 18, Cmt. at 31, to articulate
a plausible rationale for characterizing the plate as a closely-identified item with the body).
133. See id.
134. Mary Kate Kearney & Mary Jane Kearney, Reflections on Good (Law) Teaching, 2001 L. Rev.
M.S.U.-D.C.L. 835, 840 (2001) (discussing how skills of statutory reading are “essential” for
success in law practice).
135. For an example of a discussion regarding the organization of an Evidence course that has
skills implications, see, e.g., Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Organization of the Evidence Course: The
“Preliminaries” to Helping Students Develop the Skill of Identifying Nonhearsay, 50 St. Louis Univ. L. J.
1047, 1060 (2005) (“[T]he fundamental question is which sequence of coverage makes the
most sense pedagogically. The premise of [the] Article is that the most daunting challenge
for the Evidence teacher is to help students develop the analytic skill of differentiating
between hearsay and nonhearsay. On that premise, it may be wiser to position the hearsay
rule a bit later in the course. More specifically, before taking up the hearsay rule, it seems
advisable to cover topics which will give the students understandings and skills that will
later enable them to more effectively meet the challenge of identifying nonhearsay.”).
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facts and the law to weigh out factors for one side or other. Such a skills lesson
that occurs immediately in time alongside explanation of the doctrine helps
students see the relevance for developing an ability to reason with factors that
differs from reasoning with elemental requirements.
Finally, not only can the relevance be tied to some aspect pertinent to legal
reasoning or lawyering, but the relevance can be associated with an aspect of
improvement or success in law school itself.136 Test-taking skills, such as the
example from the previous section using 2-207 to teach multiple-choice testing
and studying strategies, would be especially relevant alongside doctrine in the
first-semester of law school.137 Even if the relevance of the skills identified in the
mimesis might be remote, one might draw out a relevance that corresponds to
student success in the class. One could do this by externalizing how the skill
might be useful on an assignment or an exam. But even so, in this example at
least, an instructor would be teaching the skill of statutory interpretation that
is then distilled into issue spotting and analysis of an exam problem, and there
is worthy and relevant legal reasoning practice in that.
C. Step Three: Facilitating Discovery
In Jerome Bruner’s well-known and -studied spiral learning theory,138
Bruner places importance on the moment students discover the material that
the instructor intends for students to learn: “Mastery of the fundamental ideas
of a field involves not only the grasping of general principles but also the
development of an attitude toward learning and inquiry, toward guessing
and hunches, toward the possibility of solving problems on one’s own.”139
Developing or shaping this attitude toward transfer of knowledge to problem
solving or practice is key:
To instill such attitudes by teaching requires something more than the mere
presentation of fundamental ideas. Just what it takes to bring off such teaching
is something on which a great deal of research is needed, but it would seem
that an important ingredient is a sense of excitement about discovery—discovery
of regularities of previously unrecognized relations and similarities between
ideas, with a resulting sense of self-confidence in one’s abilities.140

As an example of instilling discovery in this manner, Bruner describes how
a sixth-grade class, having been through a conventional unit on the social and
economic geography of the Southeastern states, was introduced to the North
136. See Bohl, supra note 129, at 782. Students should be able to find relevance in a skill if it can be
tied to goals that align with academic success.
137.

See, e.g., William D. Henderson, The LSAT, Law School Exams, and Meritocracy: The Surprising and
Undertheorized Role of Test-Taking Speed, 82 Tex. L. Rev. 975, 1045 (2003) (concluding that testtaking speed and ability correlate to success on law school exams and the practice of law).

138. Jerome S. Bruner, The Process of Education 52 (1960).
139. Id. at 20.
140. Id. (emphasis added).

680

Journal of Legal Education
Central region by being asked to locate the major cities of the area on a map
containing physical features and natural resources, but no place names. The
resulting class discussion very rapidly produced a variety of plausible theories
concerning the requirements of a city[.]141

The consequence was not merely the learning of geography per se, but the
discovery and learning of the significance of urban planning.142 This moment
of discovery engages students to prod their sense of curiosity for learning
something new.
Writing about an exercise for teaching transactional contract drafting in
law school, William Foster and Emily Grant similarly note the importance in
adult learning theory of setting up a context that invites a sense of discovery:
Taking into account the students’ world of memory, experience, and response
often lightens the mental load involved in mastering a new analytical
framework or developing a new skill. Professors can better engage adult
learners by drawing explicit links between the subject matter at hand and
past experiences of the students. By seeing a connection between something
familiar and the new material, the students will generally be able to understand
the new material more quickly and effectively.143

Learning doctrine could be a fairly new and foreign endeavor and so Foster and
Grant advocate that “[u]sing familiar nonlegal contexts to teach a particular
legal skill or thought process is consistent with the research about how adult
students learn[.]”144 The similarity between Bruner’s observations and the
perspectives of Foster and Grant on teaching through a context that invites
active engagement signals the importance of building those moments in the
law classroom. In the quest to elevate skills alongside doctrine, discovery
serves to bring excitement to skills learning and to obscure that form-overfunction hierarchy. Perhaps this observation was what my colleague at Igniting
Law Teaching meant by “sneaking in the veggies.”
Once mimesis and relevance have been located in a doctrinal lesson that
also teaches skills, the moment is ripe for building a particular narrative of
discovery in the lesson. Sometimes the cases that we cover in law courses
make it extraordinarily easy to drum up a dramatic and inquisitive moment
of discovery—cannibalism in Regina v. Dudley and Stephens145 in Criminal Law,
or selling a farm while seemingly intoxicated in Lucy v. Zehmer146 in Contracts.
141. Id. at 21.
142. See id. at 22.
143. William E. Foster & Emily Grant, Memorializing the Meal: An Analogical Exercise for Transactional
Drafting, 36 U. Haw. L. Rev. 403, 409 (2014).
144. Id. at 410.
145. (1884) 14 Q.B.D. 273 (Eng.).
146. 84 S.E.2d 516 (Va. 1954).
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Without relying on sensational cases, an effective demonstration of this idea
of discovery comes when I teach food defects in Products Liability. After
assigning cases and giving students the two pertinent tests in food defect law—
the foreign-natural test147 and the consumer expectation test148—I bring in a
supermarket birthday cake to class (and on occasion with the premise that it’s
my birthday). The fact that I bring food into the classroom is inherently jarring.
But once I decide to cut into the cake, the discovery of that access point, the
mimesis between legal reasoning and law, emerges when I fish out the first
item that I have surreptitiously stuffed into the cake—usually an eggshell. At
that moment the students are yanked out of a festive expectation of birthday
cake into an exercise of reasoning, relying on the tests they have read about
and their skills of factual inquiry to determine whether the eggshell, and later
the toothpicks (one wooden and one plastic), the shard of broken glass, and a
piece of cardboard each individually would make the cake a defective product.
Knowing how to reason serves as the immediate relevance.
A less gimmicky or stagey example of discovery could be the use of
episodic television cop dramas, such as Law and Order, in a course on Criminal
Procedure, where often possible constitutional violations of search and seizure,
interrogation, police lineups and the like figure into the plot of the shows.149
The students are allowed through television dramatizations to discover how to
use rule synthesis between seminal cases and the Fourth Amendment to then
apply to a warrantless search to see if their conclusions match what actually
happens on the shows.150 The interesting take on using episodic crime shows
for law classes is that students might have seen the shows prior to law school,
but now after being immersed in doctrine and law as law students, they
presumably “know better,” and so watching examples of criminal procedure
gone wrong embodies new meaning.
Referring back to the 2-207 example, I have often taught “battle of the
forms” as just that—by playing out the narrative of a fact pattern involving
two large corporations unable to make a lucrative contract because their
preprinted documents have boilerplate terms that the classic mirror-image rule
would not tolerate as mutual assent. The moment of discovery comes when I
reveal the realist response with 2-207,151 but then also I note that in order to use
147. Michael I. Krauss, Principles of Products Liability 102 (Jesse H. Choper et al. eds., 2d
ed. 2014).
148. Id. at 115.
149. See Victoria L. Salzmann, Here’s Hulu: How Popular Culture Helps Teach the New Generation of Lawyers,
42 McGeorge L. Rev. 297, 309 (2010) (discussing the usefulness of television and films to
demonstrate legal issues in courses such as Criminal Law and Procedure).
150. Older episodes of Law & Order (NBC) and NYPD Blue (20th Century Fox) might work
better for suspense, since the average law student today would likely have been in infancy
during the initial runs of those shows.
151.

See Corneill A. Stephens, Escape from the Battle of the Forms: Keep It Simple, Stupid, 11 Lewis &
Clark L. Rev. 233, 240 (2007) (explaining Karl Llwellyn’s drafting and influence on the
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2-207 effectively to save this deal, we will need to learn its provisions by also
learning how to read statutory materials carefully the way that a scrupulous
lawyer would—in essence, discover the law through an engagement with skill.
To demonstrate their ideas about building a contextual moment for teaching
transactional contract drafting, Foster and Grant have created an exercise by
analogizing the process of contract drafting and planning to planning a group
dinner party.152 In doing so, their goal is to “help[] students get comfortable
using their ‘legal imagination’ and adding contingency planning value to
documents they draft for clients.”153 As they articulate more specifically, “[t]he
basic premise of the exercise is to walk the students through planning a social
event in this case, a dinner party. In the course of extracting the information
necessary to prudently and thoroughly coordinate the gathering, students
will naturally address a wide variety of contingencies that could threaten to
ruin the experience.”154 Planning a dinner party in this way and delineating
what happens in the case of a ruined experience is not unlike contemplating
contingencies in a commercial transaction: “For example, in the exchange
section of a stock purchase transaction, the seller may agree to transfer duly
executed stock certificates in transferable form. An analogous obligation of a
dinner party guest may be to deliver thirty-two ounces of coleslaw.”155 Not only
is this exercise creative, but it is designed in part to extend familiarity to tame
what could be a daunting skill to learn; it also alerts the student, by analogy,
to develop awareness for contingency planning.
Although step three is concerned with student discovery, this step is in some
ways also about the creativity of the instructor and ability to tie the connection
between law and legal reasoning skills to a memorable moment of student
discovery. But no matter what drama it brings into the classroom, step three
is always trying to tie the mimesis and relevance to something familiar or
something that grabs at the emotional expectation of the students to get them
to see how lively the practice of law is through knowledge and skill.
D. Synthesized Example of Mimesis, Relevance, and Discovery Using Strawberries
One of the observations that most law students encounter in their first year
is how much factual inquiry plays into the task of lawyering156—how much a
U.C.C. and that Section 2-207 “was promulgated to correct and remedy the injustices and
inequities caused by the mirror image rule and last shot rule in modern day commercial
transactions, and to modernize contract formation in light of present commercial realities.”).
152. Foster & Grant, supra note 143, at 417-22.
153. Id. at 416.
154. Id. at 417.
155. Id. (citations omitted).
156. See Deborah Zalesne & David Nadvorney, Integrating Academic Skills into First Year Curricula: Using
Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon to Teach the Role of Facts in Legal Reasoning, 28 Pace L. Rev.
271, 271-83 (2007) (explaining, in part, the importance of fact sensitivity in legal reasoning
and the teaching of it in law school).
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lawyer may be asked to play with facts,157 how many different ways playing
with facts can have variations,158 from simple issue-spotting analyses to large
persuasive and analogical challenges.159 As much about legal knowledge legal
education is also very much about the process of lawyering, and being able to
play with facts, whether simulated or real-life, bears a significant correlation
to lawyerly competency.160 Thus, I want to develop ways to make expectation
of factual inquiry nearly obligatory. And with that notion articulated, I often
begin the year of my Contracts course with a lesson on factual inquiry alongside
one of the first doctrines I teach my Contracts students: contractual offers.
For the lesson on offers, I used a picture taken at a farmers market in
Los Angeles one morning during December 2012. Of course, the picture of
a strawberry farmer’s fruit display taken from my cellphone seemed rather
nondescript: The photograph depicted a particular farmstand table showing
off more than a dozen cartons of red strawberries that framed a white
cardboard sign reading, “Strawberries 3 Packs for $7,” in misspelled shorthand
(“Straberri 3 Pak $7”). I had passed by it and would have easily missed it had
I not been thinking about the Contracts course that I would be teaching the
following semester. Of course, the picture was externally about strawberries,
but beneath the surface it could have been about a variety of other things,
including an introduction to contract formation.
One of my perceptions of how we commonly misunderstand contract law
is how pervasively non-lawyers believe that a contract is literally a formal
document with a myriad of terms and conditions in technical lawyer-speak
that must be signed by all parties in order for the deal to have effect, instead
of merely an agreement, written or not, between parties that the law will
enforce.161 Many new students to Contracts approach the subject with that
image in mind and also toss in the misperception that to do well in the course,
157.

See id. at 274 (“But students are intent on finding rules, doctrine and ‘the law’ in cases, and
very often overlook the wealth of information about how the law works contained in the
cases. In fact, their course syllabi tell them to look for the law and not much else.” (citations
omitted)).

158. See Zalesne & Nadvorney, supra note 57, at 276 (“We have identified several aspects of issue
spotting that teachers can help students with, including the baseline ability to recognize
instances of facts triggering issues, dealing with complicated sub-rules, spotting hidden
issues, and seeing connections among doctrines within your course and across law school
courses.”).
159. See Zalesne & Nadvorney, supra note 57, at 276.
160. See Jethro K. Lieberman, The Art of the Fact, 5 J. Legal Writing Inst. 25, 25-26 (1999) (arguing
that law schools should teach more fact analysis skills because “lawyers spend most of their
time … ferreting out the facts.”).
161. An even more effective misperception is one in which the same signed contract with all its
bells and whistles is affixed onto blue-backing paper, rolled up into a scroll, and sealed with
red hot wax. Of course, the signing must have been done with sharp quills and gooseberry
ink. For some listed, common non-lawyerly misconceptions about contract law, see generally
Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Legal Promise and Psychological Contract, 47 Wake Forest L. Rev. 843
(2012).
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one must also have knowledge about math and economics equivalent to a
graduate degree in finance.162 In some respects, both of those misconceptions
draw an unnecessary distance between the law and my students. A law student
with a finance or business background might be presumably thrilled with the
course at the start and lulled into a sense of perhaps (false) familiarity with
Contracts, while the law student with no such experience might shy away
from the thought of contracts. Both notions need to be dispelled and everyone
needs to be brought onto somewhat equal footing.
Once within the study of the law of contracts, another problem of insight
often arises—that some doctrines in contract law were often precise up to a
certain point, but much of the hands-on lawyerly application of the same
doctrines to some facts required some sensitivity and intuition even when
the knowledge of that doctrine had been appropriately mastered.163 This
observation is compounded by the fact that there is no unifying theory of
contracts.164 With the farmer’s sign atop the strawberries, we would know if it
connoted the beginnings of mutual assent in contract formation only once we
knew the rules for offers and preliminary negotiations. But even if we knew
those rules in theory, the verbiage and terms of art contained within them—
e.g., “manifestations of willingness to enter into a bargain,” “power of assent,”
etc.—bring a level of abstraction to an everyday transaction that distracts
students from taking note of the significance of exchanges that happen very
quickly between two enterprising parties.
How would we intuit a statement that we deem definite and certain to be a
manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain? In some situations, a lawyer
might be able to make an educated assessment and get away with an I-know-itwhen-I-see-it remark.165 However, this nonchalance is reckless and cavalier and
does not help my students do well on my exams, nor would it likely help them
in their careers when they are drafting motions attacking formation issues in a
mortgage suit gone awry or anything else in that vein. So after knowledge of
the rules, comes the skill of marshaling facts alongside intuition under what
162. See generally id.
163. See, e.g., Integrating Academic Skills, supra note 156, at 286 (discussing doctrines of good faith
and best efforts in contract law as examples of fact-sensitive doctrines suitable for teaching
factual analysis skills).
164. See Craig Leonard Jackson, Traditional Contract Theory: Old and New Attacks and Old and New Defenses,
33 New Eng. L. Rev. 365, 367 (1998) (“Like most subjects of the law, there are grey areas.
Contracts, no doubt, ranks among the top. The temptation to explain these grey areas by
unifying theory ultimately fails, and scholars in the contracts field have often reacted by
trashing the whole exercise.”).
165. For a famous example of this iteration, see Justice Potter Stewart’s concurrence from Jacobellis
v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring): “I have reached the conclusion . . . that
under the First and Fourteenth Amendments criminal laws in this area are constitutionally
limited to hard-core pornography. I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of
material I understand to be embraced within that shorthand description; and perhaps I
could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it, and the motion picture
involved in this case is not that.” (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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the law would govern as a contractual offer. Here is the moment of mimesis,
when the nature of the law surrounding formation of a contract offers me the
opportunity to discuss a certain skill in legal reasoning. Here is where the sign
over the farmer’s strawberries with its price, quantity, and description ends up
as a lesson that bears so much fruit for both explaining the muscle and spirit
of the law. This lesson on offers would also be a lesson on marshaling facts.
And that skill has practice implications, which makes the elevating of skills
with doctrine here a relevant endeavor, since the ability to marshal facts comes
up not just in my course but throughout the extent of law practice.166 Here in
Contracts it would be the ability to detect formal rules of contracting in an
everyday deal over supermarket goods. In Torts, it might be the ability to see
someone’s negligence maintaining a factory drainage gutter and be able to
articulate effectively about it as res ipsa loquitur167; or in Business Associations,
in determining why an intricate act of burying certain funds among different
corporate entities could be a reason for piercing the corporate veil.168
In addition, this lesson’s choice of subject matter also had relevance
implications. With the strawberries, their ordinariness signals to students that
contracts do happen outside the lawyer’s office and the corporate boardroom.
Contracts happen regardless of the availability of blue-backing paper and
wax seals.169 Deals can be verbal;170 exchanges can happen without a single
word being spoken.171 And they can involve everything from expensive plots
of oceanfront property right down to the sacks of fresh produce that one
brings home from the farmers market. The cases we read together in the
class—of agreements involving requirement jet fuel contracts,172 expensive
computer equipment for a large company,173 a mass commercial sale of grocery
166. For an example of the importance of this skill, see Paul T. Wangerin, Skills Training in
“Legal Analysis”: A Systemic Approach, 40 U. Miami L. Rev. 409, 431-38 (1985); see also Zalesne &
Nadvorney, supra note 57, at 276.
167. See Shelter v. Chiquita Processed Foods, L.L.C., 658 N.W.2d 242 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003).
168. See Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Pepper Source, 941 F.2d 519 (7th Cir. 1991), as reprinted in William A.
Klein et al., Business Associations: Agency, Partnerships, and Corporations 212-18
(6th ed. 2006).
169. For example, there is an array of implied warranties available under the Uniform Commercial
Code. See, e.g., U.C.C. 2-314 (implied warranty of merchantability).
170. See John Edward Murray, Jr., Murray on Contracts Ch. 4 § 69 (5th ed. 2011) (“A promise
is legally binding though expressed orally or by conduct if the other essentials for contract
formation exist. Any requirement that a contract be evidenced by a writing is a statutory
requirement.”).
171.

Id.

172. See Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 429 (S.D. Fla. 1975), as reprinted in Randy
E. Barnett, Contracts: Cases and Doctrine 404-05 (5th ed. 2012).
173. See Step-Saver Data Systems, Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 752 F. Supp. 181 (E.D. Pa. 1990), as reprinted in
Barnett, supra note 172, at 814-16.
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chickens174—are inadvertently deceiving. My goal is to use strawberries here to
shore up the intangible distance of contract law for students, and show how
hyperbolic that distance really has been.
The instrumental aspects of the photo allow for closer reading of the objects
in the image and a different opportunity for students to play with facts than
had they been described the contents of the photo in a written fact pattern.
The picture is visible and tangible, as live facts are also seen and not read.175
The sight of the strawberries in their cartons is supposed to remind them of
familiar idyllic moments at rural farmstands and open markets, and the sign
with its scribbled misspellings directs us to negotiations and beckons us to
discuss within the rules and case law who might be the intended recipient
of this farmer’s sign (someone particular, or a general public?), how definite
the sign might be in connoting an offer or, conversely, an invitation to offer,
whether the misspellings make a difference, whether the quantity and price
help show a manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain or give the
recipient a power to accept, and what would happen if someone reads the sign
and tenders exactly seven dollars or responded with a question (How much for
two packs instead? )—all to decide the legal significance of this image and whether
we have the beginnings of an agreement formed. To find whether an offer
exists here or not, students must use the facts they are seeing to tease out the
law. This endeavor is a sheer example of learning law through skill, learning
function—it is hoped—at the same level as form.
The discussion over this picture also tells us how our conventions of
consumer behavior in mass retail and commercial settings help shape how we
read (or misread) moments of buying and selling things176—moments in which
contract law figures very firmly as well. Are all the prices and goods one sees
on supermarket shelves offers or invitation to offer? How about items at an
electronic retail store instead? Can one ever bargain for a lower price on an
item at BestBuy?177 The answers to all of these questions are processed through
a careful, methodical entanglement between law and skills, form and function—as
they should be—that elevates skills alongside doctrinal knowledge.
174. See Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.S. Int’l Sales Corp., 190 F. Supp. 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), as reprinted
in Barnett, supra note 172, at 389-94.
175. See Richard K. Sherwin et al., Law in the Digital Age: How Visual Communication Technologies are
Transforming the Practice, Theory, and Teaching of Law, 12 B.U. J. Sci. & Tech. L. 227, 261 (2006)
(discussing the importance of visual literacy in legal education and that what this means
is “being able to identify the meanings that pictures leave unsaid and to translate those
perceptions into words.”).
176. See Jackson, supra note 164, at 367 (“What makes contracts such a hard course has less to
do with the basic logic than the fact that contract law is essentially about human behavior
and psychology. It is about trying to decipher what a person did. In trying to discover the
identity of an individual’s actions, we have to ponder the reasons behind the actions, which
means that we have to ponder what was in a person’s mind at a given moment.”).
177.

Incidentally, haggling at BestBuy is possible. See Hilary Stout, More Retailers See Haggling as a
Price of Doing Business, N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 2013, at A1.
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As long as I have adhered to the three-step method, much teaching and
learning utility is rendered out of one image that accesses the intersection of
those two components essential to practice and furthering the work of the
law in life. Despite the historical hierarchy of skills and knowledge, the use
of the three steps here (mimesis, relevance, and discovery) contributes to a
moment in which a useful and relevant skill of legal reasoning is suddenly
given an unspoken but important focus to resolve where the law leaves room
for interpretation. As memorable and resonant as my lesson with strawberries
has become for both doctrinal and skills competency, the single image here
achieves the teaching of skills alongside doctrine with very minimal effort,
and all of it is attributable pedagogically to finding the mimesis of law and
skill, the relevance of the lesson, and the moment of discovery that can most
whet student appetites to learning skill and law together without too much
consideration of what is actually happening pedagogically.
IV. Conclusion
In some ways, that picture of strawberries that I have used to demonstrate
to my students how to use facts and law to reach a legal conclusion represents
not just the method that I developed. The picture also represents my constant
quest here at the University of Massachusetts for finding normativity in law
teaching. One image, as an objective correlative, singly captures it all.
Until that hierarchy of doctrinal knowledge and skill and other harmful
and irrelevant hierarchies are truly abolished in the law school setting, a little
subversion of Langdell could prove lasting—at least for our students and for
the quality of our teaching. If inequality and hierarchy are what this article has
been fixated upon at its broadest angles, then this method for incorporating
skills with doctrine resembles careful but subversive assimilationist tendencies
rather than something more innocuous, as sneaking in unwanted good-foryou ingredients onto a child’s plate. Instead, I hope my method has at least
provoked readers as food for thought.

